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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-Recording of Liens-Certificate of Title
The problem of the mobility of the modern automobile versus the
tenacity of the recording statutes has once again come to the forefront.
It is quite apparent from the recent case of General Finance and Thrift
Corporation v. Guthrie' that the recordation statutes as they pertain to
S227 N. C. 431, 42 S. E. 2d 601 (1947).
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the mortgage2 or sale of automobiles on credit3 are clearly outmoded
and in dire need of major repair, or preferably, of replacement.
Charles M. York, for several months a resident of Macon, Georgia,
purchased an automobile there on May 30, 1946 on conditional sale.
The conditional sale contract was, on the same day, assigned to the
plaintiff finance corporation. It was not, however, offered for recorda-
tion until June 5. There was evidence which tended to show that York
left Macon with the car and arrived at the home of his parents in
Greensboro, North Carolina, on June 3, two days before the conditional
sale, contract was offered for recordation in Georgia. On June 12,
York sold the car to Hodges in Greensboro who shortly thereafter sold
it to the defendant Guthrie. The car bore a Georgia license plate.
Hodges had been told by his employer that York had been in some
trouble and was advised not to have too much to do with him. In an
action to recover the car from Guthrie, the trial court charged the jury
peremptorily in favor of plaintiff. On appeal the North Carolina
Supreme Court granted a new trial on the ground that since there was
evidence on the part of the defendant that the car was brought to this
state prior to the filing of the conditional sale contract for record in
Georgia, a peremptory instruction in favor of plaintiff was error.
Having remanded on the question of the location of the chattel at
the time of the filing of the conditional sale contract for recordation,
the court did not consider whether or not Hodges was a bona fide
purchaser. This factor is pertinent to the issue as the case was decided
upon the Georgia recordation statutes under the principle of comity.
The Georgia statute requires that the third party act in good faith and
without notice in order to defeat an unrecorded lien.4  Had the case
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-20: "No deed of trust or mortgage for real or
personal estate shall be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors or
purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or mortgagor,
but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage in the county where
the land lies;- or in case of personal estate, where the donor, bargainor or mort-
gagor resides; or in case the donor, bargainor or mortgagor resides out of the
state, then in the county where the said personal estate, or some part of the same,
is situated; or in case of choses in action, where the donee, bargainee or mort-
gagee resides. For the purposes mentioned in this section the principal place of
business of a domestic corporation is its residence."
I N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-23: "All conditional sales of personal property
in which the title is retained by the bargainor shall be reduced to writing and
registered in the same manner, for the same fees and with the same legal effect
as is provided for chattel mortgages, in the county where the purchaser resides,
or, in case the purchaser shall reside out of the state, then in the county where
the personal estate or some' part thereof is situated, or in case of choses in action,
where the donee, bargainee or mortgagee resides."
"GA. CoDE ANN. (Harrison, 1937) §67-2501: "Deeds, mortgages, and liens of
all kinds, which are required by law to be recorded in the office of the clerk of
the superior court, shall, as against the interests of third parties acting in good
faith and without notice, who may have acquired a transfer or lien binding the
same property, take effect only from the time they are filed for record in the
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been decided upon North Carolina law the question as to whether or
not Hodges was a bona fide purchaser would have been irrelevant.5
The settled and oft-quoted rule in this state is that no actual notice,
however full and formal, will supply the place of registration.6
Under the general rule of comity, which is recognized in a majority
of the states,7 the execution and recording of a chattel mortgage or
other lien on personal property in the county and state where the, mort-
gagor then resided and where the property then was situated, constitutes
notice to subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor in another state to
which the property is subsequently removed without the consent of the
mortgagee.8  Some states by positive law require that, within a stated
period of time, foreign mortgages be recorded locally in order to pre-
serve their effectiveness there as against third parties.9 Some few states
refuse to recognize foreign mortgages at all on chattels which have been
removed thereto without a local recordation. 10 In the principal case
the court recognized the general rule of comity," but held the rule
clerk's office. The said clerk shall keep a docket for such filing, showing the
day and hour thereof, which docket shall be open for examination and inspection
as other records of his office."
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §47-20: "... as against creditors or purchasers
for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or mortgagor, . . ."
' Brown v. Burlington Hotel Corp., 202 N. C. 82, 161 S. E. 735 (1932) ; Elling-
ton v. Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 147 S. E. 307 (1927).
of the states,7 the execution and recording of a chattel mortgage or
' Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th 1900) ; Note, 57 A. L. R. 702,
712 (1927).
" Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th 1900) ; Finance Co. v. Clary,
227 N. C. 247, 41 S. E. 2d 760 (1947) ; Truck Corp. v. Wilkins, 219 N. C. 327,
13 S. E. 2d 529 (1941) ; Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891) ;
RESTiTEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §268, comment c (1934) ; GOoDRIcH, CONFLICT
Op LAWS 154 (2d ed. 1938); STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 364(1937); 10 Am. Jua., CHATrEL MORTGAGES, §19.
'ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 47, §111, Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley and Koonce,
187 Ala. 533, 65 So. 783 (1914) ; GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison, 1937) §67-108, Hub-
bard v. Andrews, 76 Ga. 177 (1886); W. VA. CODE (Michie, et al., 1943) §3996,
Southern Finance Co. v. Zegar, 120 W. Va. 420, 198 S. E. 875 (1938).
"0 Corbett v. Littlefeld, 84 Mich. 30, 47 N. W. 581 (1890) ; Chambers v. Con-
solidated Garage Co., 231 Tex. 1072, 210 S. W. 565 (1919). As Louisiana does
not permit chattel mortgages at all, it is impossible to record a foreign mortgage
there, and such mortgage will not be effective in that state. Delop v. Windsor,
26 La. Ann. 185 (1874). VA. CODE ANN. (1942) §5197: "No mortgage, deed of
trust, or other encumbrance created upon personal property while such property
is located in another State shall be a valid encumbrance upon said property after
it is removed into this State as to purchasers for valuable consideration without
notice and creditors unless and until the said mortgage, deed of trust, or other
encumbrance be recorded according to the laws of this State in the county or cor-
poration in which the said property is located in this State."
"' Attention should be called to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Barnhill,.
General Finance and Thrift Corp. v. Guthrie, 227 N. C. 431, 434, 42 S. E. 2d
601, 604, in which he reiterates that the effect of N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)§47-20 on the general rule of comity was not decided. Universal Finance Co. v.
Clary, 227 N. C. 247. However, see Thayer, J., Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449(C. C. A. 8th 1900) : ". . . the statutes of a state which prescribe how mortgages
on personal property shall be executed and recorded are generally, if not uni-
versally, regarded as speaking with respect to mortgages made within the state
upon property there situated, and as having no reference to personalty brought
within the state which is at the time encumbered with a valid lien created else-
where," citing Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891). Text
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inapplicable where the chattel is removed before recordation from the
state of original situs. In drawing such distinction the North Carolina
Court is in accord with the decided cases. 12
Conceding the holding to be with the great weight of authority, it
has been argued that such a distinction is unsound and unwarranted.
This argument is based upon the contention that actually the notice
afforded the prospective vendee of the mortgagor' 8 in the state to which
the property has been removed is the same regardless of whether the
chattel, at the time of recordation, is within or without the confines of
the state of original situs, provided the lien is recorded before the mort-
gagor sells. Even conceding that the basis stated for such argument
is true, it does not necessarily follow that the distinction made by the
court is wholly unfounded. An examination must first be made of the
basis for the mortgagee's right of action in the second state. Admittedly
the laws of one state do not operate in another state ex proprio Vigore.1 4
Therefore, recordation in the state of original situs cannot, by the force
of the law of that state, serve as constructive notice beyond its bound-
aries.15 The mortgagee then is not in court in the second state to enforce
the law. of the state of original situs as a matter of right, but on the
st.renigth of the recognition there of the law of the state of original situs
under the principle of comity.16 Comity, at best, is a rather nebulous
concept; however, it is everywhere recognized that, at most, it is the
geographical extension of a right which was valid in its inception.17
Comity cannot be said to give validity to a right which would not be
recognized in the state of original situs.18 Recordation of a chattel
vriters also generally agree that recordation statutes do not affect the general
rule of comity unless such statutes are expressly or by clear implication applicable
to contracts made out of the state, in respect to property subsequently brought into
the state. 11 Am. JuR., CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§75, 77, 78; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS §154 (2d ed. 1938); BF.LI, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §266.2 (1935);
JONEs, CHATrEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §260a (6th ed. 1933); RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§268, 275; STUmBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS '361 (1937).
2 Bridges v. Barrett, 6- Ill. App. 122 (1906); Carroll v. Nisbet, 95 S. D.
479, 70 N. W. 634 (1897) ; Cunningham v. Donelson, 110 W. Va. 331, 158 S. E.
1705 (1931); Yund v. First National Bank of Shawnee, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6
(1905) ; see Golt v. Dibrell, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 146, 153 (1836); RESTATEMENT,
CONFICT OF LAwS, §265 (1934).
' By construction and extension of the language of N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
§47-23 the court has developed the rule that conditional sales are in legal effect
chattel mortgages in North Carolina. Grier v. Weldon, 205 N. C. 575, 172 S. E.
200 (1933). Throughout this note, therefore, the terms "mortgage," "mort-
gagee," and "mortgagor" will include respectively, "conditional sale contract,"
"conditional vendor," and "conditional vendee."
"4 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §1.6 (1935); 11 Am. JuR., CONFLICT OF LAWS,§4.
15See Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 312, 79 S. W. 796 (1904), overruled on
another point in Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S. W. 490 (1911).SSnyder v. Yates, supra note 15.
"Applewhite Co. v.- Etheridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588 (1936).
182 BEALE CONFLICT OF LAWS §267.1 (1935).
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mortgage after the chattel covered thereby has been removed to another
state is said to be ineffective.10 Under that doctrine it is apparent that
the distinction drawn by the court is valid.
This state of the law places the mortgagee in a precarious position.
A scoundrel, knowing the law, can on Saturday afternoon, after the
office of the Register of Deeds has closed, purchase an automobile in
any town in North Carolina, execute a chattel mortgage with knowledge
that it cannot be recorded until Monday morning and easily cross the
state border before the mortgage can be recorded. Even after the mort-
gage has been recorded, he can state the actual facts to his purchaser
in another state and the mortgagee will lose his security upon proof.
by the second purchaser that the automobile was removed from North
Carolina before the mortgage was recorded 20
The solution to this problem does not lie in the opposite holding,
i.e., that recordation is notice to all the world irrespective of the location
of the chattel at that time. Such holding, perhaps, would be more
equitable under the facts of the principal case since examination of
the record at Macon on the day of purchase would have disclosed the
lien, but it would necessarily cover other fact situations in which it
would place an undue burden upon an innocent purchaser. For instance,
suppose X purchases a car in Charleston, South Carolina, from Z and
executes a chattel mortgage thereupon covering a large portion of the
purchase price. The next week X, for business reasons, removes the
automobile and his family permanently to Greensboro, North Carolina.
The mortgage is not recorded in Charleston. Six months later X de-
cides to sell the car to Y, a resident of Greensboro, stating there are no
liens or incumbrances outstanding against it. Y ascertains that the car
was purchased in Charleston and has a search made of the records there,
which of course, is fruitless. A week later Y and Z consummate the
sale, but in the meantime Z has heard of the preliminary dickering in
Greensboro and rushes down and records the mortgage two days before
the sale is consurhmated. Z's claim is superior to'that of Y under the
supposed state of law, the recordation being notice to the world irre-
spective of the location of the chattel at the time, and Y, after having
exercised reasonable diligence, is out the price paid for the automobile.2 1
10 Bridges v. Barrett, 126 I11. App. 122 (1906); Carrol v. Nisbet, 95 S. D.
479, 70 N. W. 654 (1897) ; Yund v. First National Bank of Shawnee, 14 Wyo. 81,
82 Pac. 6 (1905).
" It is recognized that in North Carolina a mortgagor who removes the chattel
with intent to defeat the mortgagee is subject to criminal penalty, N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §14-114.
"It is recognized that this situation is not peculiar to interstate transactions.
The very same situation may well arise in an intrastate sale under the present
law. It is felt, however, that to extend the doctrine to include interstate sales,
thereby involving greater distances, would greatly prejudice the rights of the
vendee from the mortgagor.
19481
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It is submitted that as a stopgap, i.e., an immediate remedy for these
situations until a more suitable remedy is provided, relief may be had
by the insertion of a reasonable time provision into the present recorda-
tion statutes.2 2 The number of days determined to be a reasonable time
should be specifically set forth in the statute. It should then be pro-
vided that if a chattel mortgage or lien covering a motor vehicle or any
equipment or accessories therefor which are in the state when the se-
curity is created is recorded within the stated time such recordation shall
constitute notice from the date of execution of the mortgage or other
lien whether or not the chattel is removed subsequent to the creation of
the security.23 Under such statute the general rule of comity would
protect the mortgagee against a sale in another state following an un-
authorized removal prior to the actual recordation, provided the chattel
was located within the state of original situs at the time the mortgage or
other lien was executed. The chattel is normally in the state of original
situs at the time of the execution of the mortgage as the execution of
the mortgage and delivery of the chattel are generally performed simul-
taneously.
Though the insertion of the reasonable time clause would offer
relief to the vendor in North Carolina who records the title retention
instrument without delay, it by no means suffices to enable recordation
fully to accomplish its purpose. The purpose of recordation is twofold,
to give notice of the divided ownership and to protect innocent third
parties against fraud.24  The present recordation statutes as they per-
tain to'mortgages executed in North Carolina 25 require that the instru-
ment be filed in the county of which the vendee is a resident and if the
vendee be a non-resident, then in the county where the chattel is lo-
cated.2 6 There is no requirement of a second recordation upon a change
of residence within the state by the mortgagor.27 A chattel mortgage filed
in the wrong county is ineffective. 28 As to foreign mortgages on chattels
brought into this state the North Carolina court, in Truck Corporation
v. Wilkins,29 recognized the general rule of comity, stating that a foreign
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20, 47-23.22See VA. CoDE ANN. (1942) §5189: ". . . provided, that if such filing for
docketing be done within five days from the delivery of the goods and chattel to
the vendee, it shall be as valid as to creditors and purchasers as if such filing for
docketing had been done on the day of such delivery of the goods and chattels."
Smith v. Fuller, 152 N. C. 7, 67 S. E. 48 (1910).
" Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th 1900); Hornthal v. Burwell,
109 N. C. 10, 15, 13 S. E. 721, 722 (1891).
2 6In re Franklin, 151 Fed. 642 (E. D. N. C. 1907) ("County where mortgagor
resides," refers to county in which he resides at the time the mortgage is made) ;
Bank v.*Cox, 171 N. C. 76, 87 S. E. 967 (1916) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20,
47-23.2 Harris v. Allen, 104 N. C. 86, 10 S. E. 127 (1888).
21 Bank v. Cox, 171 N. C. 76, 87 S. E. 967 (1916) ; Weaver v. Chunn, 99 N. C.
431, 6 S. E. 370 (1887).2219 N. C. 327, 13 S. E. 2d 529 (1941).
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lien properly executed and recorded in the state of original situs will be
upheld in this state without local recordation as against North Carolina
purchasers or creditors who attach the chattel in North Carolina. The
difficult position of the vendee of a used automobile brought into the
state for resale was recognized by the passage of a statute in 1937 reg-
ulating the sales of such automobiles.30 The portion of the statute
requiring the execution of a bond to cover possible losses to the North
Carolina vendee occasioned by failure of the title of the vendor was
held unconstitutional the same year.3 1 The statute was repealed in
1945.32
The prospective purchaser in North Carolina of a used car must
follow with care a prolonged procedure in order that he may purchase
with the assurance that'he will get title to the car. Suppose X, a resi-
dent of Charlotte, wishes to purchase a used car from Y, also a resident
of Charlotte. X must determine, first, whether Y was a resident of North
Carolina at the time he purchased the car, and secondly, whether Y
actually purchased the car inside North Carolina or in some other juris-
diction. Then: (a) If X finds Y was a resident of North Carolina at
the time he purchased the car and further that the car was purchased
in North Carolina, he must determine the county of which Y was at the
time a resident and search the records there ;33 (b) if X finds Y was a
resident of North Carolina but purchased the car outside the state, X
must ascertain what constitutes a valid lien in that jurisdiction against
a chattel in the possession of a non-resident, and then take the fiecessary
steps to determine if such lien exists ;34 (c) if X discovers that Y was
not a resident of North Carolina at the time he purchased the car, but
that the sale was consummated within this state, he must determine in
what county the chattel was situated at the time Y made the purchase
and search the records there;35 (d) upon discovery that Y, at the time
he purchased the car, was not a resident of North Carolina and that
the sale was consummated outside the state, the fact situation of the
principal case, X must determine what constitutes a valid, lien in that
jurisdiction and take the necessary steps to determine if such lien
exists.3 6
It appears that under the present recordation statutes the North
Carolina vendor is in a precarious position and as to the North Carolina
vendee the expression "caveat emptor" has great significance. Under
such circumstances it would certainly appear desirable to adopt a dif-
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-220 through 20-223.
- McLain v. Hoey, 19 F. Supp. 990 (E. D. N. C. 1937).N. C. Sess. Laws 1945, c. 635.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20, 47-23.
,Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-20, 47-23.
"Truck Corp. v. Wilkins, 219 N. C. 327, 13 S. E. 2d 529 (1941).
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ferent method of registering automobile liens, one which provides central
registration for the whole state, simplifies the procedure for registration
and investigation, and combines actual notice through documents in
common use in the trade with constructive notice through recordation
in one place. In a recent note3 7 it was very ably pointed out that the
fundamentals of such a system exist at present in the provisions of the
North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act.38 Attention was directed to the
pertinent provisions of the Act and their adaptability to the proposed
system was pointed out. The author also proposed and submitted for
adoption as an addition to the present Act the provisions necessary to
put the desired method of registering automobile liens into effect.30 It.
3 1Note, 24 N. C. L. Ray. 63 (1945).38 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§20-38 through 20-84.
"Note, 24 N. C. L. Rzv. 63, 71 (1945) :
"1. No mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or title retention contract, or
other lien or encumbrance on or covering a motor vehicle or on any equipment or
accessories affixed or sold to be affixed to such vehicle shall be valid as against
creditors or subsequent purchasers or encumbrances but from its registration in
compliance with sections 2 to 6 of this act.
2. There shall be deposited with the register of deeds in the county where such in-
strument is executed a copy of the instrument evidencing such lien or encumbrance,
with an attached or endorsed certificate of a notary public, accompanied by the
certificate of title last issued for such vehicle, or if no certificate has been issued
therefor, by an application by the owner for an original certificate of title. Upon
receipt of the above documents in proper order the regsiter of deeds shall endorse
thereon the date and hour received, and shall collect a registration fee, which shall
be uniform throughout the state. On the same day on which received, the register
of deeds shall forward said documents, together with such part of the fee charged
as may be prescribed by statute, to the department of motor vehicles for filing
and recording of the lien of encumbrance upon the certificate of title. Further filing
or registration in the office of register of deeds shall not be required nor of legal
effect.
3. Upon receipt of the copy of the instrument evidencing a lien or encumbrance
and the certificate of title or application therefor, the department shall file the
same, and shall issue a new certificate of title in usual form, giving the name of
the owner and a statement of all liens and encumbrances certified to the depart-
ment against said vehicle. The department shall maintain an appropriate index
of all lien, encumbrance or title retention instruments filed, and shall furnish upon
request information on liens and encumbrances against motor vehicles.
4. Such filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title shall constitute the
exclusive method of giving constructive notice of all mortgages, deeds of trust,
conditional sale or title retention contracts or other liens or encumbrances against
the vehicle described therein, and such mortgages and other instruments shall be
exempt from the provisions of sections 47-20 and 47-23 of the General Statutes
of North Carolina. Provided, that if the documents referred to above are received
and time of receipt endorsed thereon by the register of deeds within six days after
date said documents were executed, -constructive notice shall date from the time of
execution, otherwise from the time of receipt as shown by the endorsement of the
register of deeds thereon.
5. The holder or owner of every mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or
title retention contract or other lien or encumbrance on any vehicle registered in
another state and filed or recorded in that state shalf within ninety days after such
vehicle is removed to this state file with the department of motor vehicles the
original or a certified copy of such mortgage or other instrument. Every Mort-
gage or other instrument not so filed shall be subject to any lien or encumbrance
against such vehicle thereafter filed with the department according to this act,




is resubmitted that the proposed system be adopted. In order to give
added assurance that recordation will accomplish its twofold purpose,
it is submitted that the following suggestions should be incorporated
into and adopted with the already proposed sections:
1. Delivery of the certificate of title by the Motor Vehicle Depart-
ment should be to the person in whose name the certificate is
issued.
Under the present provision, certificates of title upon which liens or
encumbrances are shown are delivered or mailed by the department to
the holder of the first lien or encumbrance.4" It is felt that having the
certificate in the hands of the possessor of the automobile .has definite
advantages over the present system. The vendor of equipment for the
car or a person who is about to take a second mortgage on the car
as collateral security for a loan could readily determine the- actual state
of the title to the automobile before he completes the transaction. Should
the mortgagor attempt to sell the car his prospective vendee would be
afforded a convenient means of determining the status of the title. The
fact that the certificate is today held at perhaps some distant locality by
the first lienholder is often costly to trusting third parties.
2. Every satisfaction of a lien should be acknowledged before a
notary public and a certification thereof be obtained from the
notary.
The only apparent opportunity for fraud resulting in the possession of
the certificate of title by the mortgagor lies in the opportunity afforded
him to mark the debt satisfied and subsequently represent such to be a
fact in the furtherance of a resale. It is felt that the suggestion just
made would almost wholly remove the possibility of such fraud.
3. Each dealer should be required to obtain a certificate of title
for every new car received.
It is felt that this requirement would not constitute a hardship upon the
dealer. On the other hand such a provision would afford every pro-
spective purchaser of a new car a convenient means of determining the
status of the title thereto. It is believed that such a provision would
prevent the purchase of new cars by innocent parties only to discover
that they have bought a law suit.
41
6. This act shall be in full force and effect from and after the date of its rati-
fication, except that it 'shall not affect the validity of any mortgage, deed of trust,
conditional sale or title retention contract, or other lien or encumbrance on a
motor vehicle which was executed and registered according to law at the date of
such ratification. But all such mortgages and other instruments not filed with the
department within a period of six months after said date of ratification shall be
subject to liens and encumbrances thereafter filed against such vehicle."
40 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §20-57(f).
' Whitehurst v. Garrett, 196 N. C. 154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928).
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4. The sale of an automobile which is not accompanied by a sur-
render of the certificate of title to the vendee should be tendered
null and void.
Compliance with this suggestion would work a hardship on neither
party. It is simply a police measure for the purpose of rendering it
virtually impossible for a person to purchase a car without having been
afforded every possible opportunity to determine if there is a lien out-
standing thereon. As all liens or encumbrances are shown on the cer-
tificate, this suggestion would afford actual as well as constructive notice
of all encumbrances against the car to the prospective vendee.4
A national registration system is the ultimate goal to be achieved. 43
Today seventeen states and the -District of Columbia make the certificate
constructive notice of liens and encumbrances, and exempt mortgages on
automobiles from the general recording acts.44  In addition there are
many other states, including North Carolina,45 which require certificates
of title for motor vehicles, but do not make notations of liens on the
certificates constructive notice. This legislative trend is laying the
foundation, which it is believed will bring reasonably uniform state
statutes and perhaps national registration into being in the near future.
It is felt that North Carolina's adoption of the proposed system, in addi-
tion to giving real meaning to constructive notice in this state, would
bring nation-wide registration one step nearer to actuality.
WILLIAM H. BURTON, JR.
12 Even conceding that there is a strong argument against making the sale void
for noncompliance, it is submitted that such a strong sanction will in the long run
afford greater protection to the vendees by producing a universally known prac-
tice of surrendering the title certificate to the vendee.
" Isaacs, Installment Selling: The Relation Between Its Development in Mod-
em Business and the Law, 2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoM 140 at 146 (1935).
"ARIZ. CODE ANN. (1939) §66-231; CODES OF CAL. (Deering, 1943) Vehicle
Code §195-8; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) §5574(a) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943) §319.15;
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §48-402, as amended by IDAHO SESS. LAWS 1941, c. 144;
MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, Supp. 1944) §9.1497 (applies to accessories only) ;
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §3488, as amended by LAWS OF Mo. (1941), "Conveyances"
(excepts mortgages given for purchase money, motor vehicles sold by the manu-
facturer or their distributing dealer, and "mortgages given by dealers to secure
loans on the floor plan stock of motor vehicles:'); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §1758.3; NEB. Comp. S'rAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1941)
§60-1009, as amended by NEB. SEss. LAWS 1943, c. 134, §4; NEV. Comp. LAWS
(Supp. 1931-41) §4435, as amended by NEv. STAT. 1945, c. 240 §§15(a)-(g) ; N. J.
STAT. ANN. (1940) §39:10-14 (conditional sales only); N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941)
§§68-113-9, as amended by N. M. LAWS 1943, c. 73, §§8, 10; OHIo GEN. CODE
ANN. (Page, 1938) §6290-9; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 75, §§33,
38; TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon, Supp. 1945) art. 1436-1, §41-5; UTAH CODE
ANN. -(1943) §§57-3a-80-7; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1942)
§2154(64) (b) ; D. C. CODE (1940) §40-702.
" Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 160, 129 S. E.
414. 416 (1925).
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